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Abstract. We study the inefficiency of mixed equilibria, expressed as
the price of anarchy, of all-pay auctions in three different environments:
combinatorial, multi-unit and single-item auctions. First, we consider
item-bidding combinatorial auctions where m all-pay auctions run in
parallel, one for each good. For fractionally subadditive valuations, we
strengthen the upper bound from 2 [23] to 1.82 by proving some struc-
tural properties that characterize the mixed Nash equilibria of the game.
Next, we design an all-pay mechanism with a randomized allocation rule
for the multi-unit auction. We show that, for bidders with submodular
valuations, the mechanism admits a unique, 75% efficient, pure Nash
equilibrium. The efficiency of this mechanism outperforms all the known
bounds on the price of anarchy of mechanisms used for multi-unit auc-
tions. Finally, we analyze single-item all-pay auctions motivated by their
connection to contests and show tight bounds on the price of anarchy of
social welfare, revenue and maximum bid.
1 Introduction
It is a common economic phenomenon in competitions that agents make irre-
versible investments without knowing the outcome. All-pay auctions are widely
used in economics to capture such situations, where all players, even the losers,
pay their bids. For example, a lobbyist can make a monetary contribution in or-
der to influence decisions made by the government. Usually the group invested
the most increases their winning chances, but all groups have to pay regardless of
the outcome. In addition, all-pay auctions have been shown useful to model rent
seeking, political campaigns and R&D races. There is a well-known connection
between all-pay auctions and contests [21]. In particular, the all-pay auction can
be viewed as a single-prize contest, where the payments correspond to the effort
that players make in order to win the competition.
In this paper, we study the efficiency of mixed Nash equilibria in all-pay
auctions with complete information, from a worst-case analysis perspective, us-
ing the price of anarchy [16] as a measure. As social objective, we consider the
social welfare, i.e. the sum of the bidders’ valuations. We study the equilibria
induced from all-pay mechanisms in three fundamental resource allocation sce-
narios; combinatorial auctions, multi-unit auctions and single-item auctions.
In a combinatorial auction a set of items are allocated to a group of selfish
individuals. Each player has different preferences for different subsets of items
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and this is expressed via a valuation set function. A multi-unit auction can
be considered as an important special case, where there are multiple copies of a
single good. Hence the valuations of the players are not set functions, but depend
only on the number of copies received. Multi-unit auctions have been extensively
studied since the seminal work by Vickrey [24]. As already mentioned, all-pay
auctions have received a lot of attention for the case of a single item, as they
model all-pay contests and procurements via contests.
1.1 Contribution
Combinatorial Auctions. Our first result is on the price of anarchy of simultane-
ous all-pay auctions with item-bidding that was previously studied by Syrgkanis
and Tardos [23]. For fractionally subadditive valuations, it was previously shown
that the price of anarchy was at most 2 [23] and at least e/(e − 1) ≈ 1.58 [8].
We narrow further this gap, by improving the upper bound to 1.82. In order to
obtain the bound, we come up with several structural theorems that characterize
mixed Nash equilibria in simultaneous all-pay auctions.
Multi-unit Auctions. Our next result shows a novel use of all-pay mechanisms to
the multi-unit setting. We propose an all-pay mechanism with a randomized al-
location rule inspired by Kelly’s seminal proportional allocation mechanism [15].
We show that this mechanism admits a unique, 75% efficient pure Nash equilib-
rium and no other mixed Nash equilibria exist, when bidders’ valuations are sub-
modular. As a consequence, the price of anarchy of our mechanism outperforms
all current price of anarchy bounds of prevalent multi-unit auctions including
uniform price [18] and discriminatory [14] auctions, with bound e/(e− 1).
Single-item Auctions. Finally, we study the efficiency of a single-prize contest
that can be modeled as a single-item all-pay auction. We show a tight bound on
the price of anarchy for mixed equilibria which is approximately 1.185. By follow-
ing previous study on the procurement via contest, we further study two other
standard objectives, revenue and maximum bid. We evaluate the performance of
all-pay auctions in the prior-free setting, i.e. no distribution over bidders’ val-
uation is assumed. We show that both the revenue and the maximum bid of
any mixed Nash equilibrium are at least as high as v2/2, where v2 is the second
highest valuation. In contrast, the revenue and the maximum bid in some mixed
Nash equilibrium may be less than v2/2 when using reward structure other than
allocating the entire reward to the highest bidder. This result coincides with the
optimal crowdsourcing contest developed in [6] for the setting with prior distri-
butions. We also show that in conventional procurements (modeled by first-price
auctions), v2 is exactly the revenue and maximum bid in the worst equilibrium.
So procurement via all-pay contests is a 2-approximation to the conventional
procurement in the context of worst-case equilibria.
1.2 Related work
The inefficiency of Nash equilibria in auctions has been a well-known fact (see
e.g. [17]). Existence of efficient equilibria of simultaneous sealed bid auctions in
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full information settings was first studied by Bikhchandani [3]. Christodoulou,
Kova´cs and Schapira [7] initiated the study of the (Bayesian) price of anarchy
of simultaneous auctions with item-bidding. Several variants have been studied
since then [2, 12, 11], as well as multi-unit auctions [14, 18].
Syrgkanis and Tardos [23] proposed a general smoothness framework for sev-
eral types of mechanisms and applied it to settings with fractionally subadditive
bidders obtaining several upper bounds (e.g., first price auction, all-pay auc-
tion, and multi-unit auction). Christodoulou et al. [8] constructed tight lower
bounds for first-price auctions and showed a tight price of anarchy bound of 2
for all-pay auctions with subadditive valuations. Roughgarden [20] presented an
elegant methodology to provide price of anarchy lower bounds via a reduction
from the hardness of the underlying optimization problems.
All-pay auctions and contests have been studied extensively in economic the-
ory. Baye, Kovenock and de Vries [1], fully characterized the Nash equilibria
in single-item all-pay auction with complete information. The connection be-
tween all-pay auctions and crowdsourcing contests was proposed in [9]. Chawla
et al. [6] studied the design of optimal crowdsourcing contest when agents’ value
are drawn independently from a specific distribution.
2 Preliminaries
In a combinatorial auction, n players compete on m items. Every player (or
bidder) i ∈ [n] has a valuation function vi : {0, 1}m → R+ which is monotone and
normalized, that is, ∀S ⊆ T ⊆ [m], vi(S) ≤ vi(T ), and vi(∅) = 0. The outcome
of the auction is represented by a tuple of (X,p) where X = (X1, . . . , Xn)
specifies the allocation of items (Xi is the set of items allocated to player i)
and p = (p1, . . . , pn) specifies the buyers’ payments (pi is the payment of player
i for the allocation X). In the simultaneous item-bidding auction, every player
i ∈ [n] submits a non-negative bid bij for each item j ∈ [m]. The items are
then allocated by independent auctions, i.e. the allocation and payment rule for
item j only depend on the players’ bids on item j. In a simultaneous all-pay
auction the allocation and payment for each player is determined as follows:
each item j ∈ [m] is allocated to the bidder i∗ with the highest bid for that
item, i.e. i∗ = arg maxi bij , and each bidder i is charged an amount equal to
pi =
∑
j∈[m] bij . It is worth mentioning that, for any bidder profile, there always
exists a tie-breaking rule such that mixed equilibria exist [22]. Actually, our
results hold for arbitrary tie-breaking rule. For completeness, we specify a tie-
breaking rule where the mechanism will allocate the item to a winner picked
uniformly from all highest bidders as in [1].
Definition 1 (Valuations). Let v : 2[m] → R be a valuation function. Then v is
called a) additive, if v(S) =
∑
j∈S v({j}); b) submodular, if v(S∪T )+v(S∩T ) ≤
v(S) + v(T ); c) fractionally subadditive or XOS, if v is determined by a finite
set of additive valuations ξk such that v(S) = maxk ξk(S).
The classes of the above valuations are in increasing order of inclusion.
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Multi-unit Auction. In a multi-unit auction, m copies of an item are sold to n
bidders. Here, bidder i ’s valuation is a function that depends on the number
of copies he gets. That is vi : {0, 1, . . . ,m} → R+ and it is non-decreasing and
normalized, with vi(0) = 0. We say a valuation vi is submodular, if it has non-
increasing marginal values, i.e. vi(s+ 1)− vi(s) ≥ vi(t+ 1)− vi(t) for all s ≤ t.
Nash equilibrium and price of anarchy. We use bi to denote a pure strategy of
player i which might be a single value or a vector, depending on the auction.
So, for the case of m simultaneous auctions, bi = (bi1, . . . , bim). We denote by
b−i = (b1, . . . , bi−1, bi+1, . . . , bn) the strategies of all players except for i. Any
mixed strategy Bi of player i is a probability distribution over pure strategies.
For any profile of strategies, b = (b1, . . . , bn), X(b) denotes the allocation
under the strategy profile b. The valuation of player i for the allocation X(b) is
denoted by vi(X(b)) = vi(b). The utility ui of player i is defined as the difference
between her valuation and payment: ui(X(b)) = ui(b) = vi(b)− pi(b).
Definition 2 (Nash equilibria). A bidding profile b = (b1, . . . , bn) forms a
pure Nash equilibrium if for every player i and all bids b′i, ui(b) ≥ ui(b′i,b−i).
Similarly, a mixed bidding profile B = ×iBi is a mixed Nash equilibrium if for
all bids b′i and every player i, Eb∼B[ui(b)] ≥ Eb−i∼B−i [ui(b′i,b−i)]. Clearly, any
pure Nash equilibrium is also a mixed Nash equilibrium.
Our global objective is to maximize the sum of the valuations of the players
for their received allocations, i.e., to maximize the social welfare SW (X) =∑
i∈[n] vi(Xi). So O(v) = O = (O1, . . . , On) is an optimal allocation if SW (O) =
maxX SW (X). In Sect. 5, we also study two other objectives: the revenue, which
equals the sum of the payments,
∑
i pi, and the maximum payment, maxi bi. We
also refer to the maximum payment as the maximum bid.
Definition 3 (Price of anarchy). Let I([n], [m],v) be the set of all instances,
i.e. I([n], [m],v) includes the instances for every set of bidders and items and any
possible valuation functions. The mixed price of anarchy, PoA, of a mechanism
is defined as
PoA = max
I∈I
max
B∈E(I)
SW (O)
Eb∼B[SW (X(b))]
,
where E(I) is the class of mixed Nash equilibria for the instance I ∈ I. The pure
PoA is defined as above but restricted in the class of pure Nash equilibria.
Let B = (B1, . . . , Bn) be a profile of mixed strategies. Given the profile B, we
fix the notation for the following cumulative distribution functions (CDF): Gij is
the CDF of the bid of player i for item j; Fj is the CDF of the highest bid for item
j and Fij is the CDF of the highest bid for item j if we exclude the bid of player i.
Observe that Fj =
∏
kGkj and Fij =
∏
k 6=iGkj . We also use ϕij(x) to denote the
probability that player i gets item j by bidding x. Then, ϕij(x) ≤ Fij(x). When
we refer to a single item, we may drop the index j. Whenever it is clear from
the context, we will use shorter notation for expectations, e.g. we use E[ui(b)]
instead of Eb∼B[ui(b)], or even SW (B) to denote Eb∼B[SW (X(b))].
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3 Combinatorial Auctions
In this section we prove an upper bound of 1.82 for the mixed price of anarchy
of simultaneous all-pay auctions when bidders’ valuations are fractionally sub-
additive (XOS). This result improves over the previously known bound of 2 due
to [23]. We first state our main theorem and present the key ingredients. Then
we prove these ingredients in the following subsections. Due to space limitation,
we give proofs of the lemmas and theorems in the full version.
Theorem 4. The mixed price of anarchy for simultaneous all-pay auctions with
fractionally subadditive (XOS) bidders is at most 1.82.
Proof. Given a valuation profile v = (v1, . . . , vn), let O = (O1, . . . , On) be a
fixed optimal solution, that maximizes the social welfare. We can safely assume
that O is a partition of the items. Since vi is an XOS valuation, let ξ
Oi
i be a
maximizing additive function with respect to Oi. For every item j we denote by
oj item j’s contribution to the optimal social welfare, that is, oj = ξ
Oi
i (j), where
i is such that j ∈ Oi. The optimal social welfare is thus SW (O) =
∑
j oj . In
order to bound the price of anarchy, we consider only items with oj > 0, as it is
without loss of generality to omit items with oj = 0.
For a fixed mixed Nash equilibrium B, recall that by Fj and Fij we denote the
CDFs of the maximum bid on item j among all bidders, with and without the bid
of bidder i, respectively. For any item j ∈ Oi, let Aj = maxx≥0 {Fij(x)oj − x}.
As a key part of the proof we use the following two inequalities that bound
from below the social welfare in any mixed Nash equilibrium B.
SW (B) ≥
∑
j∈[m]
(
Aj +
∫ oj−Aj
0
(1− Fj(x))dx
)
, (1)
SW (B) ≥
∑
j∈[m]
∫ oj−Aj
0
√
Fj(x)dx . (2)
Inequality (1) suffices to provide a weaker upper bound of 2 (see [8]). The proof of
(2) is much more involved, and requires a deeper understanding of the equilibria
properties of the induced game. We postpone their proofs in Sect. 3.1 (Lemma 5)
and Sect. 3.2 (Lemma 6), respectively. By combining (1) and (2),
SW (B) ≥ 1
1 + λ
·
∑
j
(
Aj +
∫ oj−Aj
0
(
1− Fj(x) + λ ·
√
Fj(x)
)
dx
)
, (3)
for every λ ≥ 0. It suffices to bound from below the right-hand side of (3) with
respect to the optimal social welfare. For any cumulative distribution function
F , and any positive real number v, let
R(F, v)
def
= A+
∫ v−A
0
(1− F (x))dx+ λ ·
∫ v−A
0
√
F (x)dx ,
5
where A = maxx≥0{F (x) · v − x}. Inequality (3) can then be rewritten as
SW (B) ≥ 11+λ
∑
j R(Fj , oj). Finally, we show a lower bound of R(F, v) that
holds for any CDF F and any positive real v.
R(F, v) ≥ 3 + 4λ− λ
4
6
· v . (4)
The proof of (4) is given in Sect. 3.3 (Lemma 9). Finally, we obtain that for any
λ > 0,
SW (B) ≥ 1
1 + λ
∑
j
R(Fj , oj) ≥ 3 + 4λ− λ
4
6λ+ 6
·
∑
j
oj =
3 + 4λ− λ4
6λ+ 6
· SW (O) .
By taking λ = 0.56, we conclude that the price of anarchy is at most 1.82. uunionsq
3.1 Proof of Inequality (1)
This section is devoted to the proof of the following lower bound. Recall that
the definition oj is from the definition of XOS functions.
Lemma 5. SW (B) ≥∑j∈[m](Aj + ∫ oj−Aj0 (1− Fj(x))dx).
Proof. Recall that Aj = maxxj≥0 {Fij(x)oj − xj}. We can bound bidder i’s
utility in the Nash equilibrium B by ui(B) ≥
∑
j∈Oi Aj . To see this, consider
the deviation for bidder i, where he bids only for items in Oi, namely, for each
item j, he bids the value xj that maximizes the expression Fij(xj)oj −xj . Since
for any obtained subset T ⊆ Oi, he has value vi(T ) ≥
∑
j∈T oj , and the bids
xj must be paid in any case, the expected utility with these bids is at least∑
j∈Oi maxxj≥0 (Fij(x)oj − xj) =
∑
j∈Oi Aj . With B being an equilibrium, we
infer that ui(B) ≥
∑
j∈Oi Aj . By summing up over all bidders,
SW (B) =
∑
i∈[n]
ui(B) +
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[m]
E[bij ] ≥
∑
j∈[m]
Aj +
∑
j∈[m]
∑
i∈[n]
E[bij ]
≥
∑
j∈[m]
(Aj + E[max
i∈[n]
{bij}]) ≥
∑
j∈[m]
(
Aj +
∫ oj−Aj
0
(1− Fj(x))dx
)
.
The first equality holds because
∑
i Eb[vi(b)] =
∑
i Eb[ui(b) +
∑
j∈[m] bij ]. The
second inequality follows because
∑
i bij ≥ maxi bij and the last one is implied
by the definition of the expected value of any positive random variable. uunionsq
3.2 Proof of Inequality (2)
Here, we prove the following lemma for any mixed Nash equilibrium B.
Lemma 6. SW (B) ≥∑j∈[m] ∫ oj−Aj0 √Fj(x)dx.
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First we show a useful lemma that holds for XOS valuations. We will further
use the technical Proposition 8.
Lemma 7. For any fractionally subadditive (XOS) valuation function v,
v(S) ≥
∑
j∈[m]
(v(S)− v(S \ {j})) .
Proof. Let ξ be a maximizing additive function of S for the XOS valuation v.
By definition, v(S) = ξ(S) and for every j, v(S \ {j}) ≥ ξ(S \ {j}). Then,∑
j∈[m] (v(S)− v(S \ {j})) ≤
∑
j∈S(ξ(S)− ξ(S \ {j})) =
∑
j∈S ξ(j) = v(S). uunionsq
Proposition 8. For any integer n ≥ 2, any positive reals Gi ≤ 1 and positive
reals gi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
n∑
i=1
gi∑
k 6=i
gk
Gk
≥
√√√√ n∏
i=1
Gi .
We are now ready to prove Lemma 6. We only state a proof sketch here to
illustrate the main ideas.
Proof (Sketch of Lemma 6). Recall that Gij is the CDF of the bid of player i for
item j. For simplicity, we assume Gij(x) is continuous and differentiable, with
gij(x) being the PDF of player i’s bid for item j. First, we define the expected
marginal valuation of item j w.r.t player i,
vij(x)
def
= E
b∼B
[vi(Xi(b) ∪ {j})− vi(Xi(b) \ {j})|bij = x] .
Given the above definition and a careful characterization of mixed Nash equilib-
ria, we are able to show Fij(x) · vij(x) = E[vi(Xi(b))− vi(Xi(b) \ {j})|bij = x]
and 1vij(x) =
dFij(x)
dx for any x in the support of Gij . Let gij(x) be the derivative
of Gij(x). Using Lemma 7, we have
SW (B) =
∑
i
E[vi(Xi(b))] ≥
∑
i
∑
j
E[vi(Xi(b))− vi(Xi(b) \ {j})]
≥
∑
i
∑
j
∫ oj−Aj
0
E[vi(Xi(b))− vi(Xi(b) \ {j})|bij = x] · gij(x)dx
≥
∑
i
∑
j
∫ oj−Aj
0
Fij(x) · vij(x) · gij(x)dx ,
where the second inequality follows by the law of total probability. By using the
facts that Fij(x) =
∏
k 6=iGkj(x) and
1
vij(x)
=
dFij(x)
dx , for any x > 0 such that
gij(x) > 0 (x is in the support of player i) and Fj(x) > 0, we obtain
Fij(x)·vij(x)·gij(x)=Fij(x)·gij(x)dFij
dx (x)
=
∏
k 6=iGkj(x)·gij(x)∑
k 6=i
(
gkj ·
∏
s6=k∧s 6=iGsj
)= gij(x)∑
k 6=i
gkj(x)
Gkj(x)
.
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For every x > 0, we use Proposition 8 only over the set S of players with
gij(x) > 0. After summing over all bidders we get,∑
i∈[n]
Fij(x) · vij(x) · gij(x) ≥
∑
i∈S
gij(x)∑
k 6=i,k∈S
gkj
Gkj
≥
√∏
i∈S
Gij(x) ≥
√
Fj(x) .
The above inequality also holds for Fj(x) = 0. Finally, by merging the above
inequalities, we conclude that SW (B) ≥∑j∈[m] ∫ oj−Aj0 √Fj(x)dx. uunionsq
3.3 Proof of Inequality (4)
In this section we prove the following technical lemma.
Lemma 9. For any CDF F and any real v > 0, R(F, v) ≥ 3+4λ−λ46 v.
In order to obtain a lower bound for R(F, v) as stated in the lemma, we
show first that we can restrict attention to cumulative distribution functions of
a simple special form, since these constitute worst cases for R(F, v). In the next
lemma, for an arbitrary CDF F we will define a simple piecewise linear function
Fˆ that satisfies the following two properties:∫ v−A
0
(1−Fˆ (x))dx =
∫ v−A
0
(1−F (x))dx ;
∫ v−A
0
√
Fˆ (x)dx ≤
∫ v−A
0
√
F (x)dx .
Once we establish this, it is convenient to lower bound R(Fˆ , v) for the given
type of piecewise linear functions Fˆ .
Lemma 10. For any CDF F and real v > 0, there always exists another CDF
Fˆ such that R(F, v) ≥ R(Fˆ , v) that, for A = maxx≥0{F (x) · v−x}, is defined by
Fˆ (x) =
{
0 , if x ∈ [0, x0]
x+A
v , if x ∈ (x0, v −A] .
Now we are ready to proceed with the proof of Lemma 9.
Proof (of Lemma 9). By Lemma 10, for any fixed v > 0, we only need to consider
the CDF’s in the following form: for any positive A and x0 such that x0+A ≤ v,
F (x) =
{
0 , if x ∈ [0, x0]
x+A
v , if x ∈ (x0, v −A] .
Clearly, maxx≥0{F (x) · v − x} = A. Let t = A+x0v . Then
R(F, v) = A+
∫ v−A
0
(1− F (x))dx+ λ ·
∫ v−A
0
√
F (x)dx
= A+ v −A− v
2
·
(
x+A
v
)2 ∣∣∣∣v−A
x0
+ λ · 2v
3
·
(
x+A
v
) 3
2
∣∣∣∣v−A
x0
= v − v
2
· (1− t2) + λ · 2v
3
· (1− t 32 ) = v ·
(
1
2
(1 + t2) +
2λ
3
(1− t 32 )
)
.
8
By optimizing over t, the above formula is minimized when t = λ2 ≤ 1. That is,
R(F, v) ≥ v·
(
1
2
(1 + λ4) +
2λ
3
(1− λ3)
)
=
3 + 4λ− λ4
6
·v . uunionsq
4 Multi-unit Auctions
In this section, we propose a randomized all-pay mechanism for the multi-unit
setting, where m identical items are to be allocated to n bidders. Markakis and
Telelis [18] and de Keijzer et al. [14] have studied the price of anarchy for several
multi-unit auction formats. The current best upper bound obtained was 1.58 for
both pure and mixed Nash equilibria.
We propose a randomized all-pay mechanism that induces a unique pure
Nash equilibrium, with an improved price of anarchy bound of 4/3. We call the
mechanism Random proportional-share allocation mechanism (PSAM), as it is
a randomized version of Kelly’s celebrated proportional-share allocation mecha-
nism for divisible resources [15]. The mechanism works as follows (illustrated as
Mechanism 1).
Each bidder submits a non-negative real bi to the auctioneer. After soliciting
all the bids from the bidders, the auctioneer associates a real number xi with
bidder i that is equal to xi =
m·bi∑
i∈[n] bi
. Each player pays their bid, pi = bi. In
the degenerate case, where
∑
i bi = 0, then xi = 0 and pi = 0 for all i.
We turn the xi’s to a random allocation as follows. Each bidder i secures
bxic items and gets one more item with probability xi − bxic. An application
of the Birkhoff-von Neumann decomposition theorem guarantees that given an
allocation vector (x1, x2, . . . , xn) with
∑
i xi = m, one can always find a ran-
domized allocation1 with random variables X1, X2, . . . , Xn such that E[Xi] = xi
and Pr[bxic ≤ Xi ≤ dxie] = 1 (see for example [10, 4]).
We next show that the game induced by the Random PSAM when the bid-
ders have submodular valuations is isomorphic to the game induced by Kelly’s
mechanism for a single divisible resource when bidders have piece-wise linear
concave valuations.
Theorem 11. Any game induced by the Random PSAM applied to the multi-
unit setting with submodular bidders is isomorphic to a game induced from
Kelly’s mechanism applied to a single divisible resource with piece-wise linear
concave functions.
Proof. For each bidder i’s submodular valuation function fi : {0, 1, . . . ,m} →
R+, we associate a concave function gi : [0, 1]→ R+ such that,
∀x ∈ [0,m], gi(x/m) = fi(bxc) + (x− bxc) · (fi(bxc+ 1)− fi(bxc)) . (5)
1 As an example, assume x1 = 2.5, x2 = 1.6, x3 = 1.9. One can define a random allo-
cation such that assignments (3, 2, 1), (3, 1, 2) and (2, 2, 2) occur with probabilities
0.1, 0.4, and 0.5 respectively.
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Mechanism 1: Random PSAM
Input: Total number of items m and all bidders’ bid b1, b2, . . . , bn
Output: Ex-post allocations X1, X2, . . . , Xn and payments p1, p2, . . . , pn
if
∑
i∈[n] bi > 0 then
foreach bidder i = 1, 2, . . . , n do
xi ← m·bi∑
i∈[n] bi
;
pi ← bi;
Sample {Xi}i∈[n] from {xi}i∈[n] by using Birkhoff-von Neumann decomposition
theorem such that bxic ≤ X ≤ dxie and the expectation of sampling Xi is xi;
else Set X = 0 and p = 0;
Return Xi and pi for all i ∈ [n];
Essentially, gi is the piecewise linear function that comprises the line segments
that connect fi(k) with fi(k+ 1), for all nonnegative integers k. It is easy to see
that gi is concave if fi is submodular. We use identity functions as the bijections
φi in the definition of game isomorphism. Therefore, it suffices to show that, for
any pure strategy profile b, ui(b) = u
′
i(b), where ui and u
′
i are the bidder i’s
utility functions in the first and second game, respectively. Let xi =
m·bi∑
i bi
, then
ui(b) = (xi − bxic)fi(bxic+ 1) + (1− xi + bxic)fi(bxic)− bi
= fi(bxic) + (xi − bxic)(fi(bxic+ 1)− fi(bxic))− bi
= gi
(xi
m
)
− bi = gi
(
bi∑
i bi
)
− bi = u′i(b) .
Note that gi
(
bi∑
i bi
)
− bi is player i’s utility, under b, in Kelly’s mechanism. uunionsq
We next show an equivalence between the optimal welfare.
Lemma 12. The optimum social welfare in the multi-unit setting, with sub-
modular valuations f = (f1, . . . , fn), is equal to the optimal social welfare in
the divisible resource allocation setting with concave valuations g = (g1, . . . gn),
where gi(x/m) = fi(bxc) + (x− bxc) · (fi(bxc+ 1)− fi(bxc)).
Theorem 11 and Lemma 12, allow us to obtain the existence and uniqueness
of the pure Nash equilibrium, as well as the price of anarchy bounds of Random
PSAM by the corresponing results on Kelly’s mechanism for a single divisible
resource [13]. Moreover, it can be shown that there are no other mixed equilibria
by adopting the arguments of [5] for Kelly’s mechanism. The main conclusion of
this section is summarized in the following Corollary.
Corollary 13. Random PSAM induces a unique pure Nash equilibrium when
applied to the multi-unit setting with submodular bidders. Moreover, the price of
anarchy of the mechanism is exactly 4/3.
10
5 Single item auctions
In this section, we study mixed Nash equilibria in the single item all-pay auction.
First, we measure the inefficiency of mixed Nash equilibria, showing tight results
for the price of anarchy. En route, we also show that the price of anarchy is 8/7
for two players. Then we analyze the quality of two other important criteria,
the expected revenue (the sum of bids) and the quality of the expected highest
submission (the maximum bid), which is a standard objective in crowdsourcing
contests [6]. For these objectives, we show a tight lower bound of v2/2, where v2
is the second highest value among all bidders’ valuations. In the following, we
drop the word expected while referring to the revenue or to the maximum bid.
We quantify the loss of revenue and the highest submission in the worst-
case equilibria. We show that the all-pay auction achieves a 2-approximation
comparing to the conventional procurement (modeled as the first price auction),
when considering worst-case mixed Nash equilibria; we show that the revenue
and the maximum bid of the conventional procurement equals v2 in the worst
case. We also consider other structures of rewards allocation and conclude that
allocating the entire reward to the highest bidder is the only way to guarantee
the approximation factor of 2. Roughly speaking, allocating all the reward to the
top prize is the optimal way to maximize the maximum bid and revenue among
all the prior-free all-pay mechanisms where the designer has no prior information
about the participants.
Due to the lack of space we give the proofs of theorems and lemmas in the
full version.
Theorem 14. The mixed price of anarchy of the single item all-pay auction is
1.185.
Theorem 15. In any mixed Nash equilibrium of the single-item all-pay auction,
the revenue and the maximum bid are at least half of the second highest valuation.
Lemma 16. For any  > 0, there exists a valuation vector v = (v1, . . . , vn),
such that in a mixed Nash equilibrium of the induced single-item all-pay auction,
the revenue and the maximum bid is at most v2/2 + .
Finally, the next theorem indicates that allocating the entire reward to the
highest bidder is the best choice. In particular a prior-free all-pay mechanism is
presented by a probability vector q = (qi)i∈[n], with
∑
i∈[n] qi = 1, where qi is
the probability that the ith highest bidder is allocated the item, for every i ≤ n.
Note that the reward structure considered here does not depend on the index of
the bidder, i.e. the mechanisms are anonymous.
Theorem 17. For any prior-free all-pay mechanism that assigns the item to
the highest bidder with probability strictly less than 1, i.e. q1 < 1, there exists
a valuation profile and mixed Nash equilibrium such that the revenue and the
maximum bid are strictly less than v2/2.
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